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productions. This idea is silly and elitist,
and is disproved by the authors them-
selves. In several other passages they dis-
cuss significant congressional work,
including a hearing by former senator
John Glenn, who chaired the Intergov-
ernmental Affairs Committee.
There is no criticism of President Bill
Clinton in this book. The authors repeat-
edly show him in a good light as prod-
ding the lethargic toward caring about
this new and very dangerous problem.
The authors do admit to lapses in his ad-
ministration, but they attribute them to
others—for example, Secretary of De-
fense William Cohen, who in a press con-
ference hoisted a five-pound bag of sugar
to make a point about how anthrax could
kill half the District of Columbia. Some
think he exaggerated (and the authors
agree), yet when reporting the argument
Miller, Engelberg, and Broad treat Cohen
unfairly by mixing references to Wash-
ington, D.C., and its far larger metro
area. Also, just how much should one
care if Cohen’s five-pound bag of sugar
was light by two pounds, or ten, when
the next chapter states that the Soviets
were making 4,500 metric tons of an-
thrax every year?
The efforts by many U.S. officials and
scientists were important responses to a
reality well stated in this work: the U.S.
public health system must be better inte-
grated into its national defenses—a need
recognized early on in Cold War civil de-
fense. Although civil defense later de-
clined, by 1989 the need, if not apparent,
was nonetheless great. Iraq was busy
brewing veritable swimming pools full of
anthrax, tularemia, glanders, bubonic
plague, as well as smaller amounts of
other agents. The Soviets’ formidable
biopreparat program would remain dan-
gerous, even in decline, and even now
Russia cannot be fully trusted on biowar
issues, say the authors.
Information on biological agent produc-
tion came to light throughout the 1990s.
Weapons of mass destruction are now a
prime reason why the hottest topic in
Washington is “unfinished business”
with Baghdad. But with that challenge
comes another. Whatever the world com-
munity may do to stop Iraq’s weapon
development program, Iran will still
remain, wealthier than its neighbor and
equally ready to kill people, as proven by
three decades of transnational terrorism
and ongoing development of a range of
weapons of mass destruction. North Ko-
rea is still an odd blend of militarism,
weapons of mass destruction, and occa-
sional fatuity. There must be a strategy
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Dr. Francis Duncan served as the official
historian to the Atomic Energy Commis-
sion and Department of Energy and
worked in Admiral Hyman G. Rickover’s
office from 1969 until Rickover’s retire-
ment in 1982. Duncan also has had ac-
cess to much of Rickover’s personal
correspondence, as well as that of his im-
mediate family. Indeed, Rickover’s
widow wrote the foreword to this book.
This is Duncan’s third book on Rickover,
for whom he candidly admits great admi-
ration. Although the author’s familiarity
with and admiration for his subject
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defines the book and gives it credibility,
it also constitutes the book’s greatest
weakness.
Duncan thoroughly chronicles Rickover’s
methods of achieving his goals. This
makes compelling reading for anyone
familiar with the U.S. Navy’s nuclear
propulsion program. Past and present
nuclear-trained officers and sailors will
likely be fascinated by how Rickover ma-
nipulated naval and congressional bu-
reaucratic processes to achieve his goals.
Many may find themselves nodding
familiarly at Duncan’s incantations of
Rickover’s proven formula for success—
hard work, sacrifice, self-discipline, con-
servative engineering, and technical mas-
tery. Others, however, may shake their
heads when they read how Rickover plot-
ted and pulled strings to achieve flag
rank, and how he fought retirement,
serving as an admiral for more than
twenty-seven years until he finally retired
at the age of eighty-one, in 1982. Still, al-
though these stories are interesting and
tell us much about Rickover’s character,
a biography should offer more.
As Duncan aptly shows, Rickover is justly
remembered as the father of the nuclear
navy. However, Rickover is almost
equally remembered for his abrasive and
disdainful behavior, his vindictiveness,
and his arrogance. Unfortunately,
Duncan pays little attention to these
characteristics, mentioning them only
briefly. True, Duncan does acknowledge
that Rickover could be unpleasant. He
tells how in 1951 an admiral advised
Rickover that “he could not get along
with people” and pointed out how in a
lecture Rickover had angered his audi-
ence of submarine officers “by talking
down to them and calling them stupid.”
This anecdote is notable, however, for its
inclusion rather than its honesty. Instead
of acknowledging and criticizing, or at
least lamenting, Rickover’s difficult per-
sonality, Duncan asks readers to empa-
thize with the man. For example, in 1958
Rickover was not invited to the White
House reception honoring USS Nauti-
lus’s passage under the North Pole. This
slight, says Duncan, “hurt him deeply.”
Years later, in 1982, Rickover unleashed a
tirade during a meeting with President
Ronald Reagan, venting “the fury of a
goaded man who felt manipulated, pa-
tronized, and humiliated.” But it is diffi-
cult to feel much sorrow for the old
admiral, who, at least by reputation, was
so often guilty of even worse behavior.
One can imagine that Rickover’s
long-standing adversaries and enemies
would be acutely aware of Duncan’s ap-
parently inadvertent irony.
Another weakness is Duncan’s short
shrift to Rickover’s private life. In the
early chapters, Duncan makes significant
use of letters between Rickover and his
first wife during their courtship and early
marriage, but that’s it. His first wife re-
ceives little further mention, and his son
receives even less. Rickover’s second
marriage gets only slightly more atten-
tion. The near absence of discussion be-
tween Rickover and family or friends
leaves a critical void. No reason is offered
for these omissions. Perhaps Duncan be-
lieved that Rickover, private citizen, did
not warrant as much attention as
Rickover, public servant. Perhaps
Rickover’s family authorized the biogra-
phy on the condition that his personal
life remain off limits. The absence of this
material is striking and yet possibly reveal-
ing. It could be that once Rickover lost
himself in his work, his family life suf-
fered, which would not be surprising.
Rickover demanded that level of commit-
ment and sacrifice from those who
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worked for him, and all indications are
that he demanded the same of himself.
One comes away from this biography
with an appreciation for Rickover’s ac-
complishments in the Navy but with no
understanding of the man. Rickover cer-
tainly left an enduring and immensely
valuable legacy, but Duncan should have
been fully open and fair, reporting all the
pertinent aspects of his life. A biography
should neither unduly venerate nor un-
justly condemn. Duncan comes peril-
ously close to writing a hagiography.
Most readers would have much preferred
honesty and a more complete depiction
of the complex human being Hyman
Rickover was.
WILLIAM S. MURRAY
Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy
Naval War College
Ring, Jim. We Come Unseen. London: John Murray,
2001. 270pp. £20
Books about submarines are generally
disapproved of, unless they are technical
volumes describing the characteristics
and performance of potentially hostile
fleets. A couple of recent accounts of
American operations have run into shal-
low water. For example, Roger Dunham
was obliged to censor much of his Spy
Sub (Naval Institute Press, 1996) and
conceal the fact that he had served on the
USS Halibut on classified projects, one of
which was the discovery of the wreck of a
Soviet submarine in the Pacific. Exer-
cising discretion, Dunham called his boat
Viperfish and never identified the K-219,
the Soviet Golf II that went down in 1968
with ballistic missiles aboard and became
the target of a celebrated CIA salvage op-
eration, code-named JENNIFER.
Two years later, Dunham’s efforts to
comply with the demands of the U.S.
Navy to protect Halibut proved counter-
productive when Sherry Sontag, Christo-
pher Drew, and Annette Lawrence Drew
published their best-selling Blind Man’s
Bluff: The Untold Story of American Sub-
marine Espionage (PublicAffairs, 1998).
Their detailed description of the eaves-
dropping and other secret operations
conducted by Halibut over many years
had clearly been informed by inside
sources. Finally, John Pina Craven, for-
merly the chief scientist with the U.S.
Navy’s Special Projects program, released
The Silent War: The Cold War Battle be-
neath the Sea (Simon & Schuster, 2001),
giving more details of Halibut’s activities
and providing his own astonishing expla-
nation of the loss of the K-219. According
to Craven, the Soviet submarine’s com-
mander had been preparing for a rogue
missile launch aimed at Hawaii when his
vessel sustained a sudden, catastrophic ac-
cident that sent it plunging to the sea floor.
Until recently, such disclosures have
been uniquely American, with almost
nothing released in England about the
Royal Navy’s nuclear partnership with its
U.S. cousins or about its contributions
to the clandestine combat fought in the
Arctic against the “boomers” (ballistic-
missile submarines) of the Red Banner
Northern Fleet. That silence has now
been broken by Jim Ring, who marks the
British submarine service’s centenary
with remarkable revelations about the
cat-and-mouse games played off
Murmansk, the extraordinary phenome-
non of “ice damage” (a euphemism for
underwater collision), as well as the de-
ployment of hunter-killer submarines to
the South Atlantic in 1982 during the
Falklands War.
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